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FINANCIAL PACKAGING IN PERSPECTIVE
SAMUEL L. HAYES, III*
Much attention has been given to the current breed of financial expert
who appears to gain attractive "leverage" for his firm's stockholders by
devising imaginative new financial packages. Despite recent market reverses
for the shares of leading conglomerates, many sophisticated observers in the
financial community have exhibited a certain amount of awe at the creative
boldness of a James Ling or a Charles Bludhorn in constructing these
complex financing proposals.' It is the contention of this article that there
is little if anything which is "new" either in the specific financing instru-
ments now being used or in combinations thereof. Rather, whatever genius
that can reasonably be attributed to these financial managers stems from
their skill in adapting long-established financing instruments to new en-
vironmental circumstances.
There are really only four basic categories of financial instruments from
which to choose: the common share, the preferred share, the debt instru-
ment and the equity option or warrant. Clearly, none of these is a contem-
porary creation. No one would question the central role of the common
stock and debt instrument dating from the very earliest organized business
firms. Preferred shares can also be traced to several of the first English
companies in the mid-sixteenth century.2 Warrants (and the related equity
conversion privilege) go back almost as far -there is a record that a Welsh
silver miner issued warrants in connection with a refinancing in 1690. 3
The terms incorporated in these securities offer considerably more
opportunity for innovation. Such features as the income provision, equity
participation, liquidation claim, and voting rights can be varied to produce
a much larger matrix of possible packages than is indicated by the initial
four security types. Even so, it is difficult to conceive of a financial package
which does not have historical precedent. For instance, much attention has
been given to a bond-warrant package devised by Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc.
to effect a recapitalization several years ago.4 The important features were
the ability to use the bonds at par as a substitute for cash to exercise the
warrants and the issuer's option to lower the warrants' exercise price by
certain amounts for limited time periods. An essentially similar financing
package, described by Arthur Stone Dewing in his classic treatment of
financing instruments,5 was in use during the economic boom of the 1920's.
*Associate Professor of Finance, Columbia University Graduate School of Business.
B.A., Swarthmore College, 1959; M.B.A., Harvard University, 1961; D.B.A., Harvard Uni-
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1 Some Candid Answers from James J. Ling, FORTUNE, Aug. 1969, at 92.
2W. SCOTT, JOINT STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720 ch. 1 (1912).
3 Id. at ch. II.
4 Some Candid Answers from James J. Ling, FORTUNE, Sept. 1969, at 137.
5 A. DEWING, A STUDY OF CORPORATION SECURITIEs 381 (1934).
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The historic ebb and flow of these more complex financing instruments
appears to be influenced by at least three important factors: (1) the trend
in the securities markets; (2) the memory span of the financial and business
community; and (3) the changing environmental constraints surrounding
the financing decision.
TREND OF THE MARKETS
Dewing observed that certain financing instruments tend to surface in
the latter stages of protracted bull markets.6 He suggested that the most
likely explanation of this phenomenon was a relaxation of investor fears
about a market decline, encouraged by a sustained upward trend in stock
prices. In such an atmosphere, investors displayed a willingness to participate
in hybrid security financings (involving equity options and other special
features) without raising serious questions as to their marketability under
adverse market conditions. His hypothesis acquires contemporary credibility
in the bull market of the 1960's; a recent study showed a marked change in
the composition of corporate financings during the bull market period
1964-1968, from relatively uncomplicated securities in the earlier stages to
relatively more sophisticated financing instruments in the latter stages of
that equity market advance. 7
MARKET'S MEMORY SPAN
The oftentimes unsatisfactory market performance of these sophisticated
securities in the wake of the inevitable collapse of an exhausted bull market
is the key to understanding the second determinant of the ebb and flow in
complex financial packaging. The market has a long memory and appears
to harbor a grudge against investment vehicles which have yielded inor-
dinant losses.
The warrant is a case in point. Although it was a popular financing
vehicle during the bull market of the 1920's, its inherent price volatility
threw it into disrepute in the 1930's.8 The warrants of the American and
Foreign Power Company, for instance, were initially attached to $270
million of second preferred stock. At their peak price of $175 in 1929, they
had a market value in excess of $1 billion. Their price declined disastrously
in the wake of the 1929 crash, and in the recapitalization finally completed
in 1952 the warrants were valueless although American and Foreign Power
remained solvent.9
The stigma surrounding this form of equity option persisted until the
mid-1960's, when investors began to "discover" all over again that the
warrant was often more valuable than the then dominant convertible option
6 Id.
7 Hayes & Reiling, Sophisticated Financing Tool: The Warrant, HARv. Bus. REv.,
Jan.-Feb. 1969, at 137.
S B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTrLE, SEcURITY ANALYSIS 656 (4th ed. 1962).
9 Id. at 657.
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because the detachment of the equity option from the bond gave the
investor greater flexibility.10 Yet Dewing had long before established this
same point when he observed that "corporations found that .. . investor
customers would pay more when the warrant was removable [from the
bond] and, therefore, subject to a separate and independent market.""
It apparently took the passing of a generation of aggrieved investors and
shell-shocked corporate financial officers before an objective reexamination
of the merits of the warrant could be made. Its complete rehabilitation was
marked by the January, 1970 announcement that American Telephone and
Telegraph Company would employ warrants as part of a giant ($1.5 billion)
rights offering to its stockholders and that the New York Stock Exchange
would relax its no-warrants rule in order to list the company's new equity
options. 12
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS
Given the financial markets' natural preference for simple, clearly-
understood financing arrangements, however, it is questionable whether
either an extended bull market or investor amnesia would ever encourage
widespread use of sophisticated financial instruments were it not for the
shifting environmental constraints on corporate financing and personal
investing. While there have undoubtedly been dips and rises in such regula-
tion in the past, the general trend in the United States during the twentieth
century appears to be in the direction of increasing controls. Today, for
instance, complex tax laws and accounting conventions exert powerful
influences - either consciously or inadvertently - on corporate financing
arrangements. Their impact on the usefulness of preferred stocks and
convertible debentures will serve here as illustrations.
Preferred stocks had fallen into disfavor in the post-World War II
period partly because the tax laws gave an advantage to debentures with tax-
deductible interest and partly because preferred shares were associated with
financial weakness.13 This stigma arose, it should be noted, because pre-
ferred shares were often created as substitutes for debt instruments in the
capital structures of companies unable to service their fixed obligations
during the Depression. As with warrants, they continued in disfavor during
the 1950's and many companies sought to demonstrate their financial
integrity by retiring all preferred issues which remained outstanding from
the Depression years.
It required the merger boom of the 1960's to bring preferred shares
back into their own, largely due to the structure of the tax laws which
made it difficult to effect a tax-free exchange without using some form of
10 Hayes & Reiling, supra note 7.
11 A. DEWING, supra note 5, at 401.
12 N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1970, at 33, col. 8.
13 Donaldson, New Framework For Corporate Debt Policy, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr.
1962, at 117.
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voting stock.' 4 Because the common share offered no flexibility in terms,
financial officers turned to the preferred stock, which could be essentially a
"blank check" to management, issuable in special series with terms tailored
to a particular group of investors.
As an example of just how far an alert management can go in construct-
ing a special financial instrument to circumvent tax barriers, consider the
terms of a tender offer made by Kinney National Corporation for the stock
of Warner Brothers - Seven Arts Ltd. in 1969.15 Kinney's offer was designed
to outbid a competing proposal from another Warner suitor which included
a taxable warrant. Kinney sought to make its own package tax-free by
replacing the warrant feature with a unit of a special series of preferred
stock convertible for 10 years into one Kinney common share upon payment
of $37 (the current market price of the Kinney common) or upon the
surrender of 15 additional shares of the preferred. The preferred was to
pay a nominal dividend and would be entitled to one-half of a vote, an
essential feature of a tax-free exchange. 16 In most other respects, this security
is equivalent to a warrant in everything but name, and appears to be largely
a creation of the current tax laws.
The impact of accounting conventions on financial packaging is illus-
trated by the changing attitude toward convertible debentures. In a com-
panion article in this Symposium,17 Professor Henry B. Reiling points out
that prior to 1967, companies were permitted to exclude convertible options
from the calculation of earnings per share as reported to stockholders. This
made it attractive for aggressive financial managers to attempt to market
this quasi-equity security in the place of a straight common stock offering
because, among other benefits, the issuing company received a higher price
for the underlying common shares' s and temporarily avoided dilution.
Beginning in 1967, a change in accounting principles 9 made the convertible
debenture less attractive by reclassifying many such issues as common stock
equivalents. This prompted some innovative financial managers to turn
to the bond-warrant combination, which continued to be excluded from
the definition of a common stock equivalent until 1969.20 Even in the wake
of the 1969 bulletin, the practical dilution implications of the warrant are
significantly less onerous than those of the convertible option and it con-
tinues to be the favored vehicle.
In conclusion, there is little today that is really "new" in corporate
14 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 368(a)(1)(B), (C).
15 MOODY'S INDUSTRIALS MANUAL, Mar. 11, 1969, at 1479.
16 INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, §§ 368(a)(1)(B), (C).
17 See Reiling, p. 880 supra.
18 Brigham, An Analysis of Convertible Debentures: Theory and Some Empirical
Evidence, 21 J. FINANCE 35 (1966).
19 AICPA, Accounting for Lawyers, ARB No. 9 (1966).
20AICPA, APB Op. No. 15 (1966).
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financings. We operate along an historical continuum in which financing
techniques are largely predictable as a function of the prevailing business
environment and the near-term history of the financial markets. This
observation may encourage aspiring financial experts to become more
serious students of business history.
